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Note
Biotechnology’s Great Divide: Strengthening the

Relationship Between Patent Law and Bioethics
in the Age of CRISPR-Cas9
Hannah Mosby*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1953, James Watson and Francis Crick discovered the
chemical structure of DNA.1 Less than 40 years later, results of
the first successful gene editing experiment were published in a
1991 edition of Science.2 Then, in 2003, the National Human
Genome Sequencing Consortium released the first complete
sequence of the human genome.3 In 2015, researchers in China
published the results of the first known use of gene editing
technology in human embryos.4 That technology—the gene

© 2018 Hannah Mosby
* J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Minnesota Law School. B.S.
Genetics, Clemson University. I am incredibly grateful to the Journal editors
and staff for their diligent work, and to Susan Wolf for her guidance during the
writing process. Additional thanks to my wonderful support network—
especially to my partner Luc, my loving family, and the law school classmates
who have become like family.
1. The Francis Crick Papers, U.S. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE, NAT’L
INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/Narrative/SC/pnid/143 (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
2. N.P. Pavletich & C.O. Pablo, Zinc Finger-DNA Recognition: Crystal
Structure of a Zif268-DNA Complex at 2.1 A, 252 SCIENCE 809 (1991); see also
Genome Editing: A Brief History, ALLELE BIOTECHNOLOGY, http://www
.allelebiotech.com/genome-editing/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
3. The Human Genome Project Completion: Frequently Asked Questions,
NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH,
https://www.genome.gov/11006943/human-genome-project-completionfrequently-asked-questions/ (last updated Oct. 30, 2010).
4. Puping Liang et al., CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Gene Editing in Human
Tripronuclear Zygotes, 6 PROTEIN & CELL 363 (2015); see also David Cyranoski
& Sara Reardon, Chinese Scientists Genetically Modify Human Embryos,
NATURE (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.nature.com/news/chinese-scientistsgenetically-modify-human-embryos-1.17378#/bl.
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editing system CRISPR-Cas9—is now in preparation for its first
clinical trial, which is scheduled to commence sometime in
2018.5 In the 70 years since its conception, the field of
biotechnology has expanded exponentially, and has produced
countless innovations that have positively impacted human
health. Each discovery enables the next, and scientists continue
to charge forward—patents in tow—on their quest to modify and
improve human existence. In the face of such a concrete public
benefit,6 it’s all too easy to forget the ethical shadows looming
behind many of these biotechnologies.
Patents function both to fund and incentivize research,7 and
therefore play a huge role in the development of new technology.
Yet modern U.S. patent law has long been a stranger to ethics.
Although the patent prosecution process involves weighing,
measuring, and challenging virtually every facet of an invention8
in the name of protecting the “patent bargain,”9 it has not
involved even the slightest consideration of the invention’s
ethical, legal, or societal implications since at least the turn of
the century.10 The Moral Utility Doctrine—a loosely-defined
nineteenth century common law doctrine that allowed for
judicial consideration of an invention’s socially or morally
5. Chelsea Gohd, The First CRISPR Clinical Trial Could Begin in 2018,
FUTURISM (Dec. 17, 2017), https://futurism.com/first-crispr-clinical-trial/.
6. Many of these benefits go unappreciated in twenty-first century life,
but biotechnology has been responsible for detecting, treating, and curing
countless diseases. These health science developments—many building on the
innovations that came before them—have improved the lives of individuals with
diabetes, genetic diseases, cancers, and many other debilitating or deadly
conditions. See generally Biotechnology Solutions for Everyday Life, BIOTECH.
INNOVATION
ORG.,
https://www.bio.org/articles/biotechnology-solutionseveryday-life (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
7. See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
8. To receive a patent, an invention must be patent-eligible, useful, novel,
and nonobvious, in addition to satisfying a host of procedural requirements. See
generally infra note 40 and accompanying text.
9. The “patent bargain” metaphor is often used to refer to the quid pro quo
nature of obtaining a patent, and is generally articulated as follows: a patent is
a social contract in which the public provides the inventor with a benefit
(exclusive rights to an invention) in exchange for a benefit (the innovation). See
generally Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the
Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1316–18,
1328–29 (2004).
10. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (holding that inventions cannot be ruled unpatentable for lack of
utility “simply because they have the capacity to fool some members of the
public.”); see also infra note 53 and accompanying text.
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“injurious” nature11—once filled this void. However, it was
“inconsistently and sporadically” applied even before its current
dormancy.12 Further still, the Doctrine was a malleable system
of ethical regulation, subject to the convictions of individual
judges and, as such, not often reflective of society as a whole.13
Thus, whatever vestige of the Moral Utility Doctrine may
remain available in modern jurisprudence is ill-suited to the
novel and complex ethical implications of twenty-first century
technology.
Nowhere is this deficiency more apparent than in the field
of biotechnology. Recent biotechnological developments present
a renewed opportunity to consider the role of ethics in patent
law, and generate a modern U.S. patent policy that is both more
appropriate and more responsive.14 For example, gene editing
technologies—a discrete but representative subset of
biotechnology—have the potential to eradicate certain diseases,
but could just as easily be employed to modify to the human
genome in ways wholly unrelated to disease.15 In particular, the
11. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).
12. Andrew Smith, Monsters at the Patent Office: The Inconsistent
Conclusions of Moral Utility and the Controversy of Human Cloning, 53 DEPAUL
L. REV. 159, 161 (2003).
13. Common law, in contrast to statutory law, is implemented by judges in
individual cases, and therefore tends to be less uniform and evolves over time.
See generally Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law
Versus Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379
(2008). This, presumably, would be exaggerated in the case of doctrines that
involve moral and ethical considerations, which are highly personal, varied, and
volatile.
14. Even at its height, the Moral Utility Doctrine was only used to prevent
patents on inventions like gambling devices and deceptive consumer goods. See
infra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. The ethical concerns that may or may
not have been present in such devices are vastly different from those present in
biotechnology (the modification of human genomes, for example), rendering
existing precedent—if still authoritative—largely inapplicable outside of its
general premise of judicial ethical oversight.
15. One familiar refrain here is the “designer babies” argument, which
refers to parental ability to select certain traits (hair or eye color, height, or
perhaps athletic ability) in an embryo prior to implantation. Another
frequently-cited concern is germline modification, which not only removes the
genetic variant in all future offspring (eliminating the possibility of future
individuals’ autonomous choice), but could ultimately lead to a reduction in
allelic variation in certain populations. For a discussion of these concerns, see
generally Jessica Berg, Editing Human Embryos with CRISPR Is Moving
Ahead – Now’s the Time to Work Out the Ethics, THE CONVERSATION (July 28,
2017),
http://theconversation.com/editing-human-embryos-with-crispr-ismoving-ahead-nows-the-time-to-work-out-the-ethics-81732.
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CRISPR-Cas9 system has made gene editing faster, cheaper,
simpler, and more reliable than ever before, thereby expanding
both the urgency and the public relevance of these complex
ethical repercussions.16 In the face of technologies like
CRISPR,17 an opportunity to consider these implications and
balance them with the technology’s potential public benefit is
more necessary than ever—in part because of the imminence of
these ethically undesirable outcomes, but also because
consideration at the patent prosecution stage provides an
opportunity to regulate the kind of technologies that often elude
ex post facto legislation and regulation.18
This Note argues for strengthening the relationship
between U.S. patent law and ethics, and proposes a schema for
utilizing the patent prosecution process as a regulatory
mechanism for ethically controversial technologies. Part I of this
Note provides a brief introduction to U.S. patent law, the kinds
of inventions for which patents can be obtained, and the concept
of beneficial utility. This section also details the history and
current status of the Moral Utility Doctrine, and concludes with
a summary of the current relationship between U.S. patent law
and ethics. Part II highlights the issues inherent in continuing
to exclude ethical considerations from the patentability inquiry,
and discusses potential mechanisms for incorporating those
considerations moving forward. Finally, this Note concludes by
presenting a scheme of ethical regulation that utilizes principles
from the dormant Moral Utility Doctrine, coupled with changes
to United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) policy,
in order to minimize the societal risks of technologies like
CRISPR-Cas9 while continuing to incentivize progress and
innovation in biotechnology.

16. See generally infra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
17. As is common, this Note will use the term “CRISPR” as shorthand for
the multi-component CRISPR-Cas9 system.
18. Emergent technologies are often difficult to regulate because of the
delays inherent in the legislative process, which can also affect subsequent
agency regulation. See generally Gary E. Marchant, Douglas J. Sylvester &
Kenneth W. Abbot, What Does the History of Technology Regulation Teach Us
About Nano Oversight?, 37 J.L. MED. ETHICS 724 (2009) (discussing the
challenges of regulating emerging technology in the context of nanotechnology).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER AND 35
U.S.C. § 101
Patent law in the United States can be traced to a grant of
congressional authority in the Constitution itself.19 Acting
pursuant to this grant, Congress codified the first body of patent
law—colloquially, the “Patent Act”—in 1790,20 which was
amended various times until the codification of the recognizably
modern version in 1952.21 Notions of the concept of
“patentability,” however, were not incorporated until the 1870
amendment.22 Patentability—or “subject matter eligibility,” as
it is sometimes referred to23—is perhaps the most basic
requirement for obtaining a patent. To be patent-eligible, an
invention must be a “new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof[.]”24 On its face, the text of § 101 seems

19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (delegating to Congress the power to
“promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries”) (emphasis added). The presence of this explicit delegation suggests
that even at the country’s founding, protection of intellectual property was
recognized as crucial.
20. 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
21. 35 U.S.C. §§ 8–293 (1952).
22. Patent Act of 1870, Ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198-217 (1870). Specifically, a
concept of patentability akin to the current 35 U.S.C. § 101 is found in § 24 of
the 1870 version, and allows for patents on “any person who has invented or
discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof[.]” This exact language is
still used in 35 U.S.C. § 101 today: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title” (emphasis added). See also Daniel
Cole, Should Section 101 of the Patent Act Be Removed, IP WATCHDOG (June 23,
2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/06/23/section-101-patent-act-removed
/id=70230/ (“Section 101 of the patent act was added in 1870 and amended in
1952.”).
23. This Note will use the terms “subject matter eligibility” and
“patentability” synonymously, as is typical in practice. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (9th
ed., rev. Jan. 2018) (using the terms interchangeably throughout examiner
guidelines) [hereinafter MPEP].
24. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
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virtually all-encompassing—there is scarcely an invention
imaginable that would not be patent-eligible.25
As is often the case with statutory interpretation, however,
the implicit exceptions to § 101 are substantially more limiting
than the text itself. Three categorical exceptions to patentability
have been acknowledged by the Supreme Court: laws of nature,
natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas.26 The “law” or
“phenomenon” of nature exclusion prevents patents such as
methods of medical treatment based on naturally-occurring
health correlations,27 or patents on unaltered living organisms.28
Contrastingly, the abstract idea restriction often arises in cases
concerning business method patents, which are highly

25. To further illustrate this sentiment, this Note encourages the reader to
think about the types of inventions enumerated in the statute—method of
conducting business would constitute a “process,” any manner of apparatus
could constitute a “machine or manufacture,” and any molecular creation could
constitute a “composition of matter.” Id. Is an invention that falls outside of
these categories even articulable?
26. These exceptions were first succinctly articulated in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“This is not to suggest that § 101 has no
limits or that it embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.”), although the
Diamond Court does cite earlier decisions as standing for the same proposition.
See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). Further, these categorical exclusions have
been repeatedly affirmed and re-articulated by the Court in modern
jurisprudence. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566
U.S. 66, 67 (2012) (holding unpatentable guidelines instructing clinicians to
“engage in well-understood, routine, conventional activity . . . [because such]
activity is normally not sufficient to transform an unpatentable law of nature
into a patent-eligible application of such a law.”); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (“In [Mayo], we set forth a framework
for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those
concepts.”) (citation removed); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (“We have long held that this
provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”).
27. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
66, 67 (2012) (holding unpatentable clinician treatment instructions based on
an observed correlation between the concentration of a particular metabolite
and drug response). But see Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827
F.3d 1042, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding patentable a method for repeated
freeze and thaw cycles of liver cells because it was a patent eligible application
of a law of nature).
28. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (holding
patentable a bacterium engineered to digest oil products, because it was
“markedly different” than anything found in nature).
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controversial.29 All three categories are excluded from
patentability because there is not enough of an “inventive
concept” present to warrant bestowing intellectual property
rights onto the inventor.30 None, however, are excluded on the
basis of moral or ethical considerations.31
Other than the recognized judicial exceptions to § 101, there
exists one notable statutory exception that applies in the realm
of biotechnology:32 the USPTO cannot grant patents “directed to
or encompassing a human organism.”33 Aside from being one of
the only external statutory exceptions to patentability, this
prohibition is also unique in that it is the only exception based
on ethical grounds applicable to biotechnology.34 One effect of
29. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 606 (2010) (holding that a
particular business method falls outside of § 101 because it claims an “abstract
idea”). In Bilski, however, the Court refused to categorically exclude business
patents because they could, in theory, be encompassed by the “process”
language of § 101. Id. at 596.
30. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978).
31. Margo A. Bagley, A Global Controversy: The Role of Morality in
Biotechnology Patent Law 318 (Univ. of Va. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 57,
2007) (“U.S. patent law contains no statutory basis for the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) or a court to deny patent protection to morally
controversial biotech subject matter.”) [hereinafter Bagley, A Global
Controversy].
32. There are a few other statutory exceptions to patentability—namely,
for nuclear technology and medical procedures—that do exist (and stem at least
in part from the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, infra note 66, but they are not germane to the biotechnologies addressed
in this Note and therefore are not discussed at length herein). See generally
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. STANDING COMM. ON THE LAW OF PATENTS,
EXCLUSIONS FROM PATENTABILITY AND EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS TO
PATENTEES’ RIGHTS (2010), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_15
/scp_15_3-annex1.pdf.
33. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 199, 118
Stat. 3, 101 (2004). This amendment was later codified into the Patent Act itself.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284, 340
(2011) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent may issue on a
claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.”).
34. This prohibition stemmed from backlash to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, which was the first time the Court held a
living organism patentable—in this instance, a bacterium. Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). However, many individuals became
concerned that this could lead to the patenting of multi-cellular organisms and,
eventually, humans, and the USPTO issued a notice afterward that explicitly
disallowed such patents. Donald J. Quigg, Animals – Patentability, 1077
OFFICIAL GAZETTE PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE 24 (1987) [hereinafter 1987
USPTO Policy], https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2013/week53
/TOCCN/item-137.htm (“A claim directed to or including within its scope a
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this ethical basis is that an otherwise ineligible invention—one
which is directed to a human organism—cannot be “cured” by
integrating it with other, patent-eligible subject matter in the
same way that other categorically excluded inventions can be.35
However, it is possible for applicants to circumvent the statute
by including in their claims a “disclaim[er] [of] any coverage for
human animals,”36 which renders the prohibition somewhat less
rigid than it appears on its face. Section 33 is Congress’ only
legislative action to date in response to public moral and ethical
concerns surrounding biotechnology and has been met with some
criticism.37
Despite sentiments that the arena of patent-eligible subject
matter is shrinking,38 this “threshold” requirement remains a
relatively low bar.39 Acknowledging the discrete exceptions
outlined above, there are no further limitations on the types of
biotechnological inventions for which a patent can be obtained.40
Furthermore, even in instances where an invention falls within
the realm of a particular exception, applicants can often employ
drafting techniques or modify their inventions to avoid subject

human being will not be considered to be patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. 101.”).
35. Dennis Crouch, Patents Encompassing a Human Organism,
PATENTLYO (Dec. 2, 2012), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/12/ex-partekamrava.html (“One exception to the cured-by-integration rule involves the
patenting of human organisms. Generally speaking, a patent clam [sic] cannot
encompasses [sic] a human organism and likewise, a claim encompassing an
otherwise unpatentable human organism will not become patentable by
integrating elements that are subject matter eligible.”).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Ava Caffarini, Directed to or Encompassing a Human
Organism: How Section 33 of the America Invents Act May Threaten the Future
of Biotechnology, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 768 (2013).
38. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness
and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the
Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 1289 (2010).
39. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 594 (2010).
40. This is not to say that there are no further substantive patent
requirements—an invention must be useful, novel, and nonobvious (among
other things) in order to sustain a patent. Instead, this Note refers only to
categorical exclusions from patentability, of which there are few. See Bilski, 561
U.S. 593 at 594 (“The § 101 eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test. Even if a
claimed invention qualifies in one of the four categories, it must also satisfy ‘the
conditions and requirements of this title.’”) (citation omitted).
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matter ineligibility.41 As such, patent-eligible subject matter is
relatively free of legal, judicial, and regulatory constraints.
B. THE MORAL UTILITY DOCTRINE
Since 35 U.S.C. § 101 created an expansive definition of
patent eligible subject matter, judges once relied on another
mechanism for regulating the content of patentable inventions:
the “utility” requirement.42 For an invention to be acceptable on
utility grounds, it must have a “specific” and “substantial”
use43—in other words, the invention must “do what is claimed.”44
This, much like the § 101 subject matter requirement, appears
on its face to be a relatively easy condition for a patent
application to satisfy, at least in the modern era.45
However, historically, many judges recognized a
“beneficiality” component to the utility requirement, which
provided an opportunity for judicial regulation of patent-eligible
subject matter on moral and ethical grounds.46 This
understanding of utility—sometimes referred to as moral or
beneficial utility—stems from the Lowell v. Lewis decision in
1817 which stipulated that an invention could not “be frivolous
or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of
society” if it were to receive a patent, per the requirements of 35

41. See Crouch, supra note 35.
42. The “utility” requirement is derived from two places in the Patent Act.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (“any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter”) (emphasis added); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring a patent
application’s specification to describe “the manner and process of making and
using [the invention]”) (emphasis added).
43. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 531, 534 (1966).
44. Gene Quinn, Understanding the Patent Law Utility Requirement, IP
WATCHDOG
(Nov.
7,
2015),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/11/07
/understanding-the-patent-law-utility-requirement/id=63007/.
45. See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge, Road Map to Revolution? Patent-Based
Open Science, 59 ME. L. REV. 339, 356 n.90 (2007) (“The utility requirement is
still properly understood as very low and generally presents a low bar to
patentability.”). However, in the wake of Brenner, many commentators felt that
the utility requirement had, in fact, been elevated for certain classes of
inventions. See, e.g., Samantha A. Jameson, The Problems of the Utility
Analysis in Fisher and its Associated Policy Implications and Flaws, 56 DUKE
L.J. 311, 313 (2006) (“In Brenner . . . the Supreme Court articulated an elevated
utility standard for research intermediates.”).
46. See Margo Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and
Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 488–89 (2003)
[hereinafter Bagley, Patent First].
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U.S.C. § 101.47 This Moral Utility Doctrine served, for a time, as
a gatekeeper to subject matter eligibility; despite the “utility”
requirement’s independent existence from the “subject matter
eligibility” requirement, the two functioned together for the
purpose of preventing patents on inventions encompassing
subject matter that did not meet “judicially identified standards
of morality.”48
For approximately 150 years, the Moral Utility Doctrine
precluded patents on immoral and deceptive inventions.49
However, use of the doctrine substantially declined as time
passed and societal values shifted.50 In Juicy Whip, Inc. v.
Orange Bang, Inc.—a case now infamous for triggering the
decline of the moral utility “requirement”—the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit was tasked with evaluating the
“usefulness” of a particular style of frozen drink machine, which
was designed to mimic a different frozen drink machine that was
more visually appealing to consumers.51 As such, the invention’s
novelty was its deceptive nature.52 The court held that an
invention’s deceptiveness should no longer be grounds for patent
invalidation on the premise of moral utility.53 Further, it
stipulated that regulating patent issuance on the basis of
morality fell within the province of the legislature and not the
judiciary,54 indicating its disapproval for the Moral Utility
Doctrine as a whole. From that point forward, courts were

47. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). Although
Justice Story may have been operating with policy concerns in mind, this
opinion suggests that he viewed moral utility as a legitimate statutory
requirement—independent from other types of utility. Id. (“The word ‘useful,’
therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or
immoral.”).
48. Bagley, A Global Controversy, supra note 31, at 320.
49. Id. For example, the Moral Utility Doctrine was regularly used to
prevent individuals from obtaining patents on gambling devices. See, e.g.,
Schultze v. Holtz, 82 F. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1897) (holding unpatentable a coinoperated gambling device).
50. See generally Bagley, A Global Controversy, supra note 31.
51. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
The invention was based on the idea that this particular machine could harness
the sanitary benefits of one kind of machine while retaining the consumer
appeal of the other. Id. at 1365–66.
52. Id. at 1365–66.
53. Id. at 1368.
54. Id. (“Of course, Congress is free to declare particular types of inventions
unpatentable for a variety of reasons, including deceptiveness.”).
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reluctant to invalidate a patent on moral utility grounds—if any
did at all.55
Whether any portion of the Moral Utility Doctrine survived
the era of Juicy Whip is the subject of debate.56 In the face of the
infamous Rifkin patent application for a human-animal
chimera57—which was filed in order to draw attention to the
potential implications of the Supreme Court’s Bilski decision—
the USPTO issued a “media advisory” that “posited that
‘inventions directed to human/non-human chimera could, under
certain circumstances, not be patentable because, among other
things, they would fail to meet the public policy and morality
aspects of the utility requirement.’”58 Regardless of its official
status, however, the doctrine is rarely—if ever—implicated in
modern jurisprudence.59 This dormancy continues today, even in
the face of patents on extremely controversial biotechnology.

55. In terms of precedential weight, the Juicy Whip decision may only have
applied to allegedly deceptive inventions, which would indicate that other kinds
of scandalous or immoral inventions were still subject to judicial scrutiny.
Regardless of its actual status, the doctrine is no longer invoked. See Bagley, A
Global Controversy, supra note 31; infra note 56 and accompanying text.
56. There exists substantial uncertainty surrounding the USPTO’s current
view of the Moral Utility Doctrine, particularly since no direct statement has
been made on its status. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 12, at 161 (“However, the
court’s refusal to invalidate the idea of moral utility altogether might signal
that the doctrine could be applied in other circumstances, or perhaps, in other
patentable subject areas.”). But see MPEP, supra note 23, § 706.03(a) (“A
rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101 for lack of utility should not be based on grounds
that the invention is frivolous, fraudulent or against public policy.”). This
inclusion in the MPEP seems to indicate that the USPTO does not support the
use of moral utility as grounds for invalidation, although it has not advocated
this viewpoint in a more public capacity.
57. The Rifkin patent application sparked extensive debate, as intended.
See, e.g., Rick Weiss, Patent Sought on Making of Part-Human Creatures,
WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics
/1998/04/02/patent-sought-on-making-of-part-human-creatures/43e259264749-4a12-a342-49678eb2f189/?utm_term=.39ae53be138d.
58. Bagley, A Global Controversy, supra note 31, at 321 (quoting the
USPTO’s Media Advisory); see also Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, Facts on Patenting Life Forms Having a Relationship to Humans (Apr.
1, 1998). However, the author notes that the USPTO has since admitted that it
is “without authority” to deny a patent on morality grounds. Id.
59. See Omar Khan & Richard Crudo, Scandalous, Immoral and
Disparaging Patents in Light of Tam, LAW 360 (Feb. 25, 2016, 10:11 AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/761308/scandalous-immoral-anddisparaging-patents-in-light-of-tam (“[C]ases denying the protection of the law
on the ground of immorality are not of this generation . . . .”) (quoting John
Gladstone Mills III et al., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 11:5 (2015)). After this
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C. INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO ETHICAL REGULATION OF
PATENTS
The U.S. approach to the relationship between ethics and
patent law is not the only approach—nor, perhaps, even the most
internationally popular. Doctrines similar to moral utility exist
in many other jurisdictions.60 For example, Europe issued the
Directive 98/44/EC (“European Biotech Directive”) in 1988 in
order to respond to changing ethical concerns brought on by the
rise of patents on biotechnology.61 This extensive directive is a
much less flexible approach to regulation than common law but
clearly stipulates “what is patentable and what is not.”62
Contrastingly—and in a manner perhaps more reminiscent of
the Moral Utility Doctrine—China has instituted a blanket
prohibition on granting patents for “invention-creations that
violate the law or social ethics, or harm public interests.”63
Although these regulations have been met with some criticism,64

decision was issued by the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court heard an appeal
and held that intellectual property rights cannot be denied on the basis of the
property’s “disparaging” character, citing free speech concerns. Matal v. Tam,
137 S. Ct. 1744, 1753–54 (2017). Notably, in this case the Court was addressing
a different kind of intellectual property—trademarks, not patents—and
interpreting the Lanham Act. Therefore, its analysis does not apply to the
context of patent law, even if one were to equate disparagement with ethical
affront. Some iteration of this principle could eventually be applied to patents,
but without authoritative remarks from the Supreme Court on the issue this
Note proceeds under the justified assumption that Tam is limited in scope to
trademark law only.
60. In other countries, the doctrine is called ordre public, which functions
similarly to the defunct Moral Utility Doctrine by allowing judicial oversight in
the patent process. See Joseph Strauss, Ordre Public and Morality Issues in
Patent Eligibility, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW
(Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2013); Khan & Crudo, supra note 59.
61. See Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J.
(L 213) 13–21.
62. Rob J. Aerts, The Patenting of Biotechnological Inventions in the EU,
the Judicial Bodies Involved and the Objectives of the EU Legislator, EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 88 (2014); see also id. at 18–19.
63. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985,
revised Dec. 27, 2008), art. 5, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws
/en/cn/cn028en.pdf (“Patent rights shall not be granted for invention-creations
that violate the law or social ethics, or harm public interests.”).
64. One set of critics of the European Biotech Directive are agriculturalists,
because of the restrictions that the directive places on the patenting of live
plants. See, e.g., BAVARIAN FARMER’S ASS’N, Criticism of EU’s Bio-Patent
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they provide examples of the various mechanisms by which
ethical considerations can play a functional role in the
patentability inquiry.
In addition to the varying approaches to ethical governance
utilized by other jurisdictions, certain frameworks exist within
international patent law—however limited that may be.
Multiple international intellectual property agreements
recognize morality exceptions to patent subject matter
eligibility.65 One example is the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”),
which allows member countries to exclude from patentability
certain inventions, in order “to protect ordre public or morality,
including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to
avoid serious prejudice to the environment.”66 Additionally, the
European Patent Convention (“EPC”) requires its member
countries to exclude patents that would be “contrary to ‘ordre
public’ or morality.”67 The approaches in international treaties
may differ, but each indicates at least the recognition of the role
that moral and ethical concerns could play in the signatories’
patent process.
D. MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY AS A UNIQUE ETHICAL HAZARD
Biotechnology constitutes an increasingly large proportion
of patented inventions—and often produces some of the most
high-profile and lucrative patents.68 Additionally, this
Directive, FRESH PLAZA (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.freshplaza.com
/article/152706/Criticism-of-EUs-bio-patent-directive.
65. Importantly, some of these are requirements, while others are
allowances. In the case of a requirement, member countries must prohibit
certain types of patents, whereas in instances of an allowance, countries are not
required to incorporate any ethical regulation—they are simply allowed to do
so if they choose.
66. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
67. The European Patent Convention art. 53, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S.
199 (revised at the Convention on the Grant of European Patents Nov. 29, 200).
This morality exception can be viewed as an extension of the ordre public
doctrine, which itself has been implemented by the European Patent Office in
a manner very similar to the historical treatment of the Moral Utility Doctrine
in the U.S. See also Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, EUR. PAT. OFF. (July 27,
2016), https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/caselaw/2016/e/clr_i_b
_2_2_2_b.htm.
68. See, e.g., Antonio Regalado, Who Owns the Biggest Biotech Discovery of
the Century?, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.technologyreview
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technology carries with it unprecedented ethical concerns69 that
will continue to expand as knowledge grows and techniques
mature. The boundaries of what exactly qualifies as
biotechnology, however, can be difficult to discern. Typically,
definitions center on an element of “manipulation” of some sort
of natural product.70 These definitions traditionally encompass
technology ranging from agricultural products to medical
devices.
One category of biotechnology often at the forefront of public
discourse is gene editing technology, making it an illustrative
context in which to discuss the relationship between ethics and
patent law.71 The term “gene editing” refers to the family of
methods that can alter the chemical structure of
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).72 DNA is a molecule found in every
living cell that contains the biological information required to
make proteins, which are required to sustain life.73 By altering
.com/s/532796/who-owns-the-biggest-biotech-discovery-of-the-century/
(discussing the three-party patent dispute over CRISPR-Cas9).
69. See, e.g., Ed Silverman, The 5 Most Pressing Ethical Issues in Biotech
Medicine, BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE 41 (2004) (addressing stem cell
research, privacy concerns, and bioterrorism, among other concerns).
70. Merriam-Webster defines “biotechnology” as “the manipulation (as
through genetic engineering) of living organisms or their components to produce
useful usually commercial products (such as pest resistant crops, new bacterial
strains, or novel pharmaceuticals); also: any of various applications of biological
science used in such manipulation.” Biotechnology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE
DICTIONARY
(2018),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/biotechnology.
71. Biotechnology spans a variety of applications and subject matter, all of
which possess their own set of ethical implications. Therefore, in an effort to
present a concise and meaningful analysis, this Note uses gene editing
technologies as a representative subset of biotechnology with clear ethical
implications. Specifically, this Note focuses on the CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing
system because of both its public attention and its widespread use. Further, in
confining its discussion to one exemplary technology, this Note attempts to
provide a real-world illustration of the implications of a continued failure to
incorporate ethical considerations into U.S. patent law, and, later, the benefits
of the proposed system of regulation.
72. Merriam-Webster defines “gene editing” as “the use of biotechnological
techniques to make changes to specific DNA sequences in the genome of a living
organism.” Gene Editing, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2018),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gene%20editing. As such, gene
editing technologies would be devices and processes that implement gene
editing techniques. See generally Gene Editing, HORIZON (2017),
https://www.horizondiscovery.com/gene-editing [hereinafter, HORIZON].
73. See generally What Is DNA?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, NAT’L
INSTS. OF HEALTH (Mar. 20, 2018), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/basics/dna;
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the structure of this molecule—specifically, the order of
nucleotides, or “base pairs”—scientists can change the
characteristics of the protein that ultimately results.74 As such,
gene editing can, in theory, remedy many clinical conditions for
which there is an underlying genetic cause.75
Gene editing technologies can be divided into four types,
based on their mechanisms of action: zinc finger nucleases
(“ZFNs”), transcription activator-like effector nucleases
(“TALENs”), meganucleases, and CRISPR-Cas9.76 All four
operate by inducing a natural cellular repair mechanism
designed to repair breakages in DNA.77 The first three of these
technologies—ZFNs, TALENs, and meganucleases—are less
precise and more labor intensive than the CRISPR-Cas9
system,78 making CRISPR a much more attractive option to
many individuals. As such, the highly accurate and relatively

Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA), NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/25520880/ (last updated June 16, 2015).
74. See HORIZON, supra note 72. Changing the order of base pairs will
change the order of amino acids that are joined during the process of
translation. Consequently, these new amino acids alter the characteristics of
the resulting protein through changes in molecular folding.
75. To be sure, this is not the only function of gene editing (though the
medicinal applications of gene editing are frequently touted as the most
exciting). Gene editing technology also has a vast array of other applications,
ranging from agriculture to hormone production. See generally Sarah Holme,
CRISPR: Emerging Applications for Genome Editing Technology, GENOMICS
RES. (June 26, 2017), https://www.technologynetworks.com/genomics/articles
/crispr-emerging-applications-for-genome-editing-technology-288978.
76. Morgan Maeder & Charles Gersbach, Genome-Editing Technologies for
Gene and Cell Therapy, MOLECULAR THERAPY 430, 432 (2016). These
technologies are listed in their order of discovery, with ZFNs being the most
established and CRISPR-Cas9 being the most recently discovered.
77. The cellular mechanism referred to here is homology-directed repair.
Id. at 430. This mechanism operates to repair breakage by using a second
homologous strand as a “template” for nucleotide insertion. By inducing DNA
breakage at certain points, gene editing technologies can remove and insert
particular base pairs, ultimately altering the protein for which the targeted
DNA codes.
78. Tomislav Meštrović, How Does CRISPR Compare to Other GeneEditing Techniques?, NEWS MED. (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.newsmedical.net/life-sciences/How-Does-CRISPR-Compare-to-Other-Gene-EditingTechniques.aspx (“CRISPR/Cas technology has entered the picture as the
faster, more straightforward and affordable way for genome-editing in
comparison to traditional ZFN and TALENs approaches.”).
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inexpensive nature of CRISPR-Cas9 made its discovery a
monumental scientific development.79
Important in the celebration of the CRISPR system’s
strengths and positive implications, however, is consideration of
the ethical concerns that its accessibility may bring. CRISPR has
enormous potential to be used in ways society may not be
prepared to condone, particularly in the context of human
germline editing (where the changes made to DNA would be
passed down to that individual’s offspring).80 In addition to
questions about equitable access and informed consent, many
individuals have a viscerally negative reaction to the use of gene
editing in human embryos for moral or religious reasons.81
Further, although the CRISPR system is safer and more
accurate than its predecessors, there remain serious doubts
about the accuracy and reliability of gene editing in a healthcare

79. There are three inventors vying for ultimate ownership of the CRISPRCas9 system, and, therefore, the credit for this enormous scientific innovation.
All three have been awarded in some manner for their contribution to the field
of genetics. See, e.g., Doudna and Charpentier Receive 2017 Japan Prize for
CRISPR Contribution, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECH. NEWS (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.genengnews.com/gen-news-highlights/doudna-and-charpentierreceive-2017-japan-prize-for-crispr-contribution/81253814/; CRISPR Pioneer
Awarded $500,000 Lemelson-MIT Prize, GENOMICS RES. (Sept. 20, 2017),
https://www.technologynetworks.com/genomics/news/gene-editing-technologydeveloper-awarded-500000-lemelson-mit-prize-291932.
80. See Genome Editing: What Are the Ethical Concerns About Genome
Editing?, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.genome
.gov/27569225/what-are-the-ethical-concerns-about-genome-editing/.
The
central concern in the context of germline editing is that one individual—the
one choosing to engage in gene editing—is thereby making a choice that is
enormously consequential for future individuals. This may be less of a concern
for some when editing is for solely therapeutic purposes—in other words, to
correct a genetic disease—but bioethicists recognize that this creates a “slippery
slope” toward non-therapeutic (sometimes called “enhancement”) uses. Id.; see
also David Masci, Human Enhancement: The Scientific and Ethical Dimensions
of Striving for Perfection, PEW RES. CTR. (July 26, 2016),
http://www.pewinternet.org/essay/human-enhancement-the-scientific-andethical-dimensions-of-striving-for-perfection/.
81. Genome Editing, supra note 80. Embryonic research is a likely
predecessor to widespread clinical use, and therefore negative reactions from
the public to such research is likely to slow progress toward therapeutic
implementation.
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setting.82 In light of these concerns, clinical use has been widely
discouraged by bioethicists until further research is conducted.83
In addition to healthcare-related issues, commentators have
noted that CRISPR’s significant desirability over other gene
editing technologies gives it the potential to produce dramatic
monopoly effects if patent protected.84 The accessibility of
CRISPR has also increased public interest and media attention,
which only heightens the potential for its misuse.85 Finally,
many entities have expressed concerns over the speed with
which CRISPR has been implemented and adapted, which has
far outpaced any potential regulatory systems.86 Ultimately,
although gene editing in the age of CRISPR-Cas9 has the
potential for immense public benefit, the corresponding ethical
considerations may hinder stakeholder benefit and public
perception if not adequately acknowledged.
E. EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON GENE EDITING: WHAT ARE THE
RULES, AND WHO ARE THE RULEMAKERS?
Although ethics does not play a role in the U.S. patent
process, it does play some role in other areas of law affecting
82. Id. These safety concerns arise from the potential to induce unintended
changes in an individual’s DNA, such as “off-target effects (edits in the wrong
place) and mosaicism (when some cells carry the edit but others do not).” Id.
83. Id.
84. John J. Mulvihill et al., Ethical Issues of CRISPR Technology and Gene
Editing Through the Lens of Solidarity, 122 BRIT. MED. BULL. 17, 25 (2017)
(“The idea that a powerful technology, such as CRISPR-Cas9 and the guide
DNA can be patented and therefore become the exclusive property of a
researcher [or their institution] is part of this debate. If the technology, which
was isolated from naturally occurring bacteria [and not invented], can be
proprietary, then many people could be denied access to its benefits outside
market mechanisms.”). A potential counter-argument to the notion of monopoly
effects is inherent in the ongoing CRISPR patent battle: if three entities can
claim credit for at least a portion of the CRISPR discovery, can a true monopoly
exist? However, a limited number of individuals controlling a highly impactful
technology could produce monopoly-like effects, even though more than one
entity controls the technology. See Ryan C. Fuhrmann, 3 Groups of Companies
That Are Almost a Monopoly, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 2, 2011),
https://www.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0911/3-groups-of-companies-thatare-almost-a-monopoly.aspx (providing various examples of “near monopoly
conditions”). Further, if the patent battle continues to engender hostility
between the patent holders, it could ultimately affect their willingness to
engage in licensing.
85. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., HUMAN GENOME EDITING:
SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND GOVERNANCE 1 (2017).
86. Id.
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biotechnology. Current restrictions on gene editing can be
divided into two central categories: funding restrictions and
market restrictions.87 In the case of funding restrictions, entities
like the National Institutes of Health (NIH) make research
grants contingent on adherence to certain conditions, some of
which have ethical bases.88 Contrastingly, Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) regulations occur later in a technology’s
life cycle and are predominantly based on product safety, rather
than ethical, concerns.89
The NIH provides a significant portion of the funding for
research that ultimately results in biotechnologies.90 Long
before modern gene editing techniques existed, the Office of
Science Policy created the Recombinant DNA Advisory
Committee (RAC),91 which “provides recommendations to the
NIH Director related to basic and clinical research involving
recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules.”92 These
recommendations shape NIH policy with respect to developing
genetic technologies, of which gene editing is no exception. At
87. These categories encompass only actual legal restrictions, and not
ethical guidelines. For example, the National Academy of Science promulgates
consensus reports on the ethics of gene editing research. See HUMAN GENOME
EDITING: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 85; see also Report
Highlights, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. & NAT’L ACAD. OF MED. (2017),
http://nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/genesite/documents/webpage/gene_177
260.pdf (“Do not proceed at this time with human genome editing for purposes
other than treatment or prevention of disease and disability” and “[e]ncourage
public discussion and policy debate with respect to somatic human genome
editing for uses other than treatment or prevention of disease and disability.”).
88. Statement on NIH Funding of Research Using Gene-Editing
Technologies in Human Embryos, NAT’L INSTS.OF HEALTH (Apr. 28, 2015),
https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-are/nih-director/statements/statementnih-funding-research-using-gene-editing-technologies-human-embryos.
89. Robert M. Califf & Ritu Nalubola, FDA’s Science-Based Approach to
Genome
Edited
Products,
FDA
VOICE
(Jan.
18,
2017),
https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2017/01/fdas-science-based-approachto-genome-edited-products/. This is not to say, however, that the FDA does not
recognize that “larger societal considerations should not be overlooked.” Id.
90. RESEARCH AM., U.S. INVESTMENTS IN MEDICAL AND HEALTH
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 2013–2015 3–4, https://www.researchamerica
.org/sites/default/files/2016US_Invest_R%26D_report.pdf (describing how the
federal government provided 22.62% of the funding required for U.S. medical
research, over 82% of which comes from the NIH).
91. Nelson A. Wivel, Historical Perspectives Pertaining to the NIH
Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, 25 HUMAN GENE THERAPY 19, 19
(2014).
92. Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH,
https://osp.od.nih.gov/biotechnology/recombinant-dna-advisory-committee/.
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the recommendation of the RAC,93 the NIH categorically refuses
to approve funding for research that incorporates the genetic
modification of human embryos. 94 This—coupled with the
longstanding federal prohibition on research in which human
embryos are “destroyed”95 —serves as a considerable barrier to
gene editing research and technology development.
In addition to being subject to certain funding restrictions,
biotechnology is also highly regulated in the marketplace. In
instances where gene editing products are targeted for use in
humans, they are “regulated under [the FDA’s] existing
framework for biological products,” which funnels hopeful
technologies through the Center for Biologics Evaluation and
Research (CBER).96 Notably, the FDA does not currently
approve therapies involving human germline editing.97
However, in conjunction with the NIH and the RAC, the FDA
recently approved the first “clinical protocol” involving the use
of CRISPR-Cas9 in human somatic cells.98 Ultimately, the FDA
has appeared to express some hesitancy in regard to the safety
of gene editing products, but it has not extensively addressed the
ethical concerns related to these technologies.
III. ANALYSIS
The relationship between U.S. patent law and ethics has
remained stagnant since the decline of the Moral Utility
Doctrine,99 despite contrasting approaches in other jurisdictions
and internationally.100 After the Federal Circuit’s criticism of the
doctrine in Juicy Whip and its suggestion that the legislature is
the appropriate entity to engender a system of ethical regulation

93. Statement on NIH Funding of Research Using Gene-Editing
Technologies in Human Embryos, supra note 88 (“[The Recombinant DNA
Advisory Committee] will not at present entertain proposals for germ line
alteration.”).
94. Eric S. Lander, Brave New Genome, 373 N. ENG. J. MED. 5, 7 (2015); see
also Statement on NIH Funding of Research Using Gene-Editing Technologies
in Human Embryos, supra note 88.
95. Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110
Stat. 26, 34 (1996) (the “Dickey-Wicker Amendment”).
96. Califf & Nalubola, supra note 89.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Bagley, A Global Controversy, supra note 31.
100. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
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in patent law,101 the judicial system has remained virtually
silent on the subject. Further, other than incorporating a
discrete prohibition on patents directed to “human organisms”
in its most recent articulation of the Patent Act,102 the
legislature has also failed to provide definite guidance.103 The
same is true of the USPTO itself.104 As such, existing U.S. patent
law has no opportunity for ethical consideration whatsoever,
despite the novel and controversial implications of many
emerging biotechnologies.
A. OPPOSITES ATTRACT: WHY ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS HAVE A
PLACE IN PATENT LAW
The time has come for us, as a society, to clarify the
relationship between patent law and ethics. The current state of
passivity—a combination of the uncertain status of the Moral
Utility Doctrine, congressional silence, and USPTO avoidance—
has masked a unique opportunity for society to voice its opinion
on new technologies by using patent protection to support only
those that provide a net benefit. Further, utilizing patent
prosecution as a means of ethical regulation is superior to any
potential ex post facto regulation scheme, because it is both more
timely and more flexible.
1. Patents as a Social Contract
Patents are a contract between two entities: the inventor
and the rest of society.105 This contract is implicit in the Patent
Act—there are certain requirements that an invention must
meet in order to qualify for patent protection, and certain
benefits an inventor can receive if the invention meets those
requirements. This ensures that an invention provides a true
benefit to society, while the protection conferred—the exclusive
right to make and use an invention for a period of 20 years—

101. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1999); see supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text.
102. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 33, 125 Stat.
284, 340 (2011) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent may
issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.”).
103. Bagley, Patent First, supra note 47, at 478–79.
104. Id. at 477–78.
105. This concept is sometimes called the “bargain metaphor.” See supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
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incentivizes inventors to invent.106 When a balance is
appropriately struck, it creates a cycle that benefits both classes
of participants—a feature responsible for much of the allure of a
patent system.
Necessarily implicit in this system is society’s approval of
those inventions that receive patent protection. These
inventions—in theory—provide enough public benefit to
warrant bestowing legal protection thereon,107 and so society has
inherently condoned both their existence and use.108 A problem
arises, however, when the potentially harmful implications of a
technology are not adequately weighed against its potential
benefits—or, worse yet, aren’t even considered in the bargaining
process. In a system of patent law with no opportunity to
consider ethical implications, it is impossible to ensure that the
public is truly receiving a net benefit in exchange for the
inventor’s “limited monopoly.”109
Biotechnologies like the CRISPR-Cas9 system raise the
stakes of the patent bargain, both negatively and positively.
These technologies are incredibly attractive because of their
potential for immense public health benefit,110 and therefore
appear to more than justify their “congressionally mandated
price.”111 However, the negative implications of these
technologies—and their potential for misuse—are also
heightened because of their accessibility, and the presence of
106. See generally Ghosh, supra note 9, at 1321–30.
107. Id. at 1320 (“In 1966, in Brenner v. Manson, the Court redefined the
quid pro quo as ‘the benefit derived by the public from an invention with
substantial utility.’”) (citation omitted).
108. In a representative democracy like the U.S., society elects political
leaders, who in turn create legislation and policy to reflect the needs of society.
Therefore, by way of Congress’ passage of the Patent Act and the terms
contained therein, society has bestowed its seal of approval on the terms of the
patent bargain. This Note, of course, recognizes that legislation is not always a
perfect reflection of the values of constituents, but that it is at least
representative of those values is a necessary assumption in representative
democracy.
109. Id. at 1320 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 161 (1989)).
110. See, e.g., Eliza Barclay, Scientists Successfully Used CRISPR to Fix a
Mutation That Causes Disease. This Is Huge., VOX (Aug. 2, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/8/2/16083300/crispr-heartdisease.
111. Bonito Boats, 897 U.S. at 152. The “price” referred to here is the
potential monopoly effect on consumers that stems from a patentee’s
exclusionary rights.
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limited governmental oversight in many research processes.112
To be sure, it is entirely possible that the benefits of technologies
like CRISPR outweigh hypothetical notions of ethical offense, or
that the public is willing to accept the associated risks. But if
there is no opportunity for these implications to even be
considered during patent law’s intrinsic “negotiation,” can it
realistically be characterized it as a fair bargain?
If we continue to sacrifice the opportunity to analyze these
ethical issues during patent prosecution, we forego an
opportunity for public input into a process where the public is a
direct stakeholder. Although it is inarguably complicated by
politics and attenuated by the U.S. democratic system,113 the
legislative process provides at least some opportunity for public
input.114 Since Patent Act legislation articulates the parameters
of the patent bargain and defines the terms of this social
contract, refusing an opportunity to fully consider the ethical,
legal, and societal implications of emerging biotechnologies at
this stage limits the opportunity for the public to weigh in
innovations that will shape their future for years to come.
2. Existing Governance Is an Insufficient Ethical Regulatory
Mechanism for Emerging Biotechnologies
Emerging technologies are inherently challenging to
regulate because they are both difficult for the non-scientific
public to understand and rapidly evolving, particularly in the
early stages of their development.115 Existing restrictions on
controversial biotechnology are inadequate regulatory
mechanisms because of their limited reach and temporally
inappropriate relationship to research. Instead, an effective
regulatory scheme must be both expansive and readily
responsive. The patent prosecution process presents a unique
opportunity for proactive ethical regulation that would mitigate
112. See Genome Editing: What Are the Ethical Concerns About Genome
Editing?, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www
.genome.gov/27569225/what-are-the-ethical-concerns-about-genome-editing/.
113. See generally supra note 108.
114. See generally Karen S. Czapanskiy & Rashida Manjoo, The Right of
Public Participation in the Law-Making Process and the Role of the Legislature
in the Promotion of this Right, 19 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L LAW 1, 1 (2008)
(“By definition, a democratic nation has some mechanism through which
leaders hear from the people.”).
115. See Carolyn Abbot, Bridging the Gap—Non-State Actors and the
Challenges of Regulating New Technology, 39 J.L. SOC. 329, 357 (2012).
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many of the issues associated with playing a game of regulatory
“catch-up” to these influential technologies.
Existing infrastructure is insufficient—standing alone—to
serve as an ethical regulatory scheme for developing
biotechnology. Restricting access to funding undoubtedly
discourages some prospective researchers, but does not alone
provide a sufficient disincentive. Although a portion of
healthcare research funding comes from federal sources, the
largest portion comes from industry116—where grant restrictions
are irrelevant. Therefore, research into ethically questionable
technologies can continue unheeded in the majority of instances.
For example, in 2017, researchers in Portland, Oregon
announced that they had “successfully modified the genetic
material of a human embryo” using CRISPR technology.117 This
research occurred despite NIH and RAC disapproval—as well as
public skepticism118—and is likely to become more common as
CRISPR technology matures. Clearly, funding restriction has
not proven to be an adequate mechanism for voicing
governmental or societal opinions on the use of these
technologies.119
Further, although FDA regulation does prevent products
from entering mainstream clinical use—thereby somewhat
mitigating their safety risk to consumers—FDA action occurs too
late in a technology’s lifecycle to be an effective means of ethical
regulation.120 By the time a technology has reached the FDA
116. RES. AMERICA, supra note 90, at 2 (“Industry invested more in R&D
than any other sector, totaling $102.7 billion.”).
117. Berg, supra note 15.
118. Cary Funk, Americans Divided on Gene Editing, with Parents of Minors
More Wary, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 8, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/08/08/americans-divided-on-gene-editing-with-parents-of-minorsmore-wary/.
119. The logical counter-argument here is that the refusal of patent
protection also would not completely eliminate the use of these technologies,
because not every technology is patented. This is absolutely correct, and this
Note does not purport to advocate completely prohibiting research into
technologies that carry ethical controversy. However, because a patent is a
social bargain, patent law is an important opportunity to voice public opinion.
This is the case even if research and further development into a technology
continues without patent protection. The patent process does not have to be the
exclusive mechanism of ethical regulation—there would need to continue to be
some market regulation from entities like the FDA—but should be at least a
component of any regulatory scheme.
120. There is also an argument to be made that the FDA does not—and
should not—base its product regulation on anything other than safety. See
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application stage, extensive research has already been
conducted121 and, therefore, many ethically questionable events
may have already occurred. In contrast, patent prosecution
occurs at an ideal point in a technology’s life cycle for regulation:
early enough to mitigate the risk of unethical use, but late
enough to allow future applications of a technology to be
somewhat apparent.122 This temporal relationship is unique to
patent law, and resolves many issues inherent in an exclusively
retroactive system like FDA regulation.
Incorporating ethical regulation into patent prosecution is
also superior to industry self-governance in many ways.
Although proponents often assert that self-regulation is a
desirable mechanism because an inventor—or, in a broader
sense, the industry in which the inventor operates—is the most
familiar with the ethical risks associated with a technology,
often the direct effect of this “regulation” is a simple “warding off
more direct government intervention.”123 Although inventor
discretion in the licensing process does provide some means of
self-regulation—including in the case of CRISPR itself124—it

Califf & Nalubola, supra note 89 and accompanying text. Undoubtedly, entities
like the RAC and the National Academy of Sciences are better-positioned to
make complex bioethical decisions. See generally notes 87, 92, and 93.
121. To begin approval proceedings, manufacturers must submit “scientific
and
clinical
data.”
About
CBER,
FDA
(Feb.
26,
2018),
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTo
bacco/CBER/ucm123340.htm. To have data available to submit, those
manufacturers have necessarily engaged in extensive preliminary research
activities.
122. In contrast to regulation at the product approval stage, attempting to
implement regulation in the basic—or preliminary—stages of research could
prove inefficient, because many of the future uses of a technology may not be
apparent at that stage. For a brief overview of product development in the
healthcare sector, see Product Development: Positioning New Healthcare
Products
in
the
Marketplace,
MARS
(Nov.
6,
2014),
https://www.marsdd.com/mars-library/product-development-positioning-newhealthcare-products-in-the-marketplace/.
123. Abbot, supra note 115, at 345.
124. See Christi Guerrini et al., The Rise of the Ethical License, NATURE
BIOTECH. 22, 22 (2017) (describing how patent licensing allows inventors to selfregulate, by “restrict[ing] socially controversial applications of a technology”).
The Broad Institute—one holder of a patent on the CRISPR-Cas9 technology—
has undertaken the licensing process “on terms intended to benefit a party not
at the negotiating table: the public.” Id. The Institute has recently licensed its
patent to Monsanto, but provided the licensee with restrictions that prohibit
the company from: “(i) performing gene drives that spread altered genes quickly
through populations, which can alter ecosystems; (ii) creating sterile
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would be unwise for the public to rely exclusively on individual
restraint in the face of technologies with such potentially large
public health effects. Further, in addition to the potential for
case-by-case variance in the restraint actually exercised by
individual patent holders and industries,125 enormous monetary
incentives are often at play for the owners of these influential
technologies.126 Undeniably, profits of this size could cloud a selfregulator’s judgment. Therefore, self-regulation—though a
desirable component of or complement to an ethical regulatory
scheme127—is an insufficient regulatory mechanism when
standing alone.
As a whole, addressing ethical concerns during the patent
process is a far more consistent, tailored, and efficient manner
in which to regulate biotechnology. Funding restrictions only
affect the subset of technologies that utilize the particular
funding mechanism, whereas patent law reaches a much larger

‘terminator’ seeds, which would impose a serious financial burden on farmers
who would be forced to buy them each year; and (iii) conducting research
directed to the commercialization of tobacco products, which might increase the
public health burden of smoking.” Id.; see also Sharon Begley, Monsanto
Licenses CRISPR Technology to Modify Crops — With Key Restrictions, STAT
(Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/09/22/monsanto-licensescrispr/.
125. This case-by-case variance is also the reason it is unrealistic to expect
the majority of developers to abide by the ethical guidelines promulgated by
entities like the National Academy of Sciences. See supra note 87 and
accompanying text. Since these recommendations do not have the force of law—
or any force at all, outside of their role in developing grant restriction policies—
researchers have little to no real incentive to abide by them.
126. The monetary implications of potentially-patentable biotechnologies
are often exorbitant. For example, CRISPR-Cas9 has already generated billions
of dollars for its patent holders. Katrina Megget, Money from Genes: CRISPR
Goes Commercial, SCI. AM. (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com
/article/money-from-genes-crispr-goes-commercial/ (“Caribou, founded by
Crispr pioneer Jennifer Doudna, has raised $15 million; Crispr Therapeutics,
set up by Charpentier, has raised $89 million since April 2014, plus $105 million
through the deal with Vertex; and Editas, founded by current Crispr patent
holder Feng Zhang, has brought in more than $160 million.”) Of note, these
figures are from early 2016, and therefore the amount of revenue that has
actually been generated to date is likely much higher. Incorporating ethical
considerations in the licensing process may serve an inventor’s own moral
framework, but refusal certainly hinders monetary potential. Therefore, it is
unrealistic to expect inventors to exercise this sort of discretion with any
regularity.
127. Abbot, supra note 115, at 344–45.
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number of potentially threatening technologies.128 Additionally,
because inventions are evaluated by a USPTO examiner on a
case-by-case basis,129 ethical regulation during the patent
prosecution process would be highly individualized. This is
enormously beneficial because the ethical issues presented by a
biotechnology can vary widely based on its unique implications,
rates of accuracy, and potential for misuse. Finally,
consideration of the ethical implications would occur soon after
the development of the technology,130 which would allow an
external assessment of the ethical risks to be made clear to the
inventor early in the research process. Together, these features
make patent law an incredibly advantageous ethical regulatory
mechanism.
B. POTENTIAL REGULATORY SCHEMES
Incorporating some ethical considerations into the patent
prosecution process is both necessary and justified, and there are
two principle tools available for crafting a potential regulatory
scheme: statutory change and common law revival.131 While a
statutory change is likely to produce more consistent outcomes
across technologies, there are drawbacks to rigid legislative

128. Since patents are so commercially desirable, any inventor that can
obtain a patent typically chooses to seek one. See Megget, supra note 126. This
creates an incentive for inventors to subject themselves to the attached ethical
regulation regardless of their funding source.
129. See generally Patent Process Overview, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-patentapplications/utility-patent/patent-process-0 (last visited Jan. 20, 2018)
(outlining patent application process and noting that USPTO reviews the
application once submitted).
130. Since novelty and non-obviousness are both requirements that depend
on a lack of the same or similar inventions, an inventor is usually best served
by seeking to obtain a patent as early as his or her invention can satisfy the
relevant requirements. Therefore, patents are typically sought as early as
possible in the inventive process.
131. Of course, both kinds of changes would also necessitate changes to
USPTO, as articulated in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP),
because of the USPTO’s agency status. See generally About Us, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/about-us (last visited Jan. 21, 2018)
(“The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is the federal
agency for granting U.S. patents and registering trademarks. In doing this, the
USPTO fulfills the mandate of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, of the Constitution
that the legislative branch ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.’”). See generally MPEP, supra note 23.
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change like stagnancy, or over-inclusiveness. Similarly,
although common law provides the flexibility necessary to
appropriately evaluate varying technologies, awakening the
Moral Utility Doctrine from its state of dormancy would revive
many of the negative characteristics associated with its demise.
1. Federal Statutory Changes Promote Uniformity, but
Minimize Flexibility
An amendment or addition to the Patent Act would provide
a concrete opportunity for ethical consideration in the patent
process, and potential overbreadth or under-inclusiveness could
be minimized if the amendment was drafted carefully. This sort
of statutory change has been proposed at two USPTO roundtable
events, but was met with limited congressional support.132
However, other jurisdictions have successfully incorporated a
statutory addition in patent law encompassing ethical
considerations—most notably, the European Union—indicating
the potential for successful implementation of this
mechanism.133
A legislative amendment would produce a desirable degree
of uniformity, in contrast to an exclusively common law
approach.134 The legislative drafting process would also
theoretically be informed by ethical and scientific experts,135
which could help appropriately tailor the language used and
reflect scientific consensus on the ethical risks of a given
technology. Further, since any legislative change would
presumably be reflected in USPTO policy, the USPTO itself
would have an opportunity to provide guidance to and refine the
approach of its examiners during the patent prosecution
process.136 Since the USPTO is the entity most familiar with

132. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT
MATTER: REPORT ON VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PUBLIC 59–64
(2017).
133. See Directive 98/44/EC, supra note 61, at 13–21.
134. See Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus
Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 396 (2008);
Luca Anderlini et al., Statute Law or Case Law? 3 (CESifo, Working Paper No.
2358, 2008).
135. The Legislative Process, IND. UNIV. CTR. ON REPRESENTATIVE GOV’T,
https://corg.indiana.edu/legislative-process (last visited Apr. 20, 2018) (“When
holding a hearing, the committee will usually call expert witnesses, occasionally
average citizens. . . .”) (emphasis added).
136. MPEP, supra note 23.
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potentially-patentable technology, its direct organizational
involvement is a huge benefit.137
However, a formal legislative amendment also has
drawbacks, and carries the potential for a host of negative
effects. Firstly, passage of legislative amendments is an
extensive process, and the amount of time needed can vary
immensely depending on their nature.138 As such, the
mechanism may be ill-suited to the regulation of dynamic
technologies—wherein the relevant ethical implications may
change over time, and often rapidly.139 Such an amendment
would also be inapplicable to patents that have already been
issued,140 and therefore has limited regulatory potential
concerning technologies that are already in existence, like
CRISPR-Cas9. Furthermore, if an extended delay occurred in
the passage of the legislative change—either initially or during
processes of amendment—the scheme would sacrifice its
regulatory capability with respect to any technologies developed
during the transitional period.
Additionally, the extent to which a resulting piece of
legislation actually reflects public opinion is highly debatable,141
and therefore what initially seems to be the preeminent strength
137. USPTO involvement would of course occur with either common law or
statutory revision, but it would be substantially more convenient for all involved
parties to solicit their involvement during policy development (as would be the
case with statutory change) rather than retroactively, as a response to litigation
(as would be the case with a purely common law approach).
138. See generally ROBERT B. DOVE, ENACTMENT OF A LAW (1997),
https://www.congress.gov/resources/download/attachments/19267597/enactlaw
.pdf?version=4&modificationDate=1446663432000&api=v2
(discussing
in
detail the Congressional procedure for enacting a law).
139. See generally Abbot, supra note 115 (discussing the challenges of
regulating new technologies and possible regulatory approaches).
140. Retroactive federal legislation is prohibited by the Constitution itself.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall
be passed.”). In patent law specifically, the effect of this prohibition is evidenced
by the America Invents Act itself, which changed many substantive patent
requirements and applies only to patents issued on or after March 16, 2013.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
141. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564,
565 (“The central point that emerges from our research is that economic elites
and organized groups representing business interests have substantial
independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while mass-based interest
groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence.”). Gilen and
Page’s research indicates that, outside of certain influential groups, the ability
of public opinion to influence legislation in any meaningful respect is limited.
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of this approach may not be as compelling as it initially appears.
Legislation would need to incorporate at least a derivative of
public opinion on controversial technologies142 in order to serve
its role in protecting the patent bargain. If it is not reflective of
public opinion, the function of incorporating consideration of the
relevant ethical issues is severely diminished. Further,
legislation would be slow to react to changes in public
opinion143—if it reacted at all—which is a substantial detriment
to regulation in light of the speed with which new
biotechnologies are produced and patented.
Finally, the legislative drafting necessary would be
immensely difficult. In order to avoid unnecessary limitation on
innovation, a potential amendment would need to provide the
opportunity for ethical consideration, without mandating a
rigorous course of analysis that would allow denial of a patent
on inappropriate grounds.144 Any potential amendment would
also need to employ terms general enough to be applicable to a
wide array of technology, but not so general as to be inapplicable
to an individual technology.145 Ultimately, drafting difficulty
could prove to be the most insurmountable challenge in utilizing
a legislative mechanism alone.146

142. See, e.g., Czapanskiy & Manjoo, supra note 114, at 1.
143. See generally sources cited supra note 134; Gilens & Page, supra note
141 and accompanying text.
144. Exactly what constitutes the appropriate grounds for ethical denial or
invalidation of a patent is beyond the scope of this Note. For a thoughtprovoking analysis of some of the relevant considerations, see Bagley, A Global
Controversy, supra note 31, at 532–47.
145. For example, the amendment could add a sentence to the patent eligible
subject matter criteria of 35 U.S.C. § 101, that reads: “Patentability may be
denied for inventions that have ethical outcomes which are yet unknown or
have been established as undesirable.” However, even with language as general
as this, there is the potential for judicial misuse or expansion. One potential
solution would be multiple amendments—each addressing a particular subtype
of invention. If this approach were preferred, the European Biotech Directive
could provide guidance. See European Biotech Directive, supra note 61. The
European Directive explicitly disallows patents on “mere DNA sequence
without indication of a function,” as well as “the human body, at any stage in
its formation or development, including germ cells,” and “plant and animal
varieties.” Id. A similar enumeration approach could be applied to 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, excluding specifically certain classes of inventions rather than broadly
excluding those which are ethically undesirable.
146. See, e.g., Bagley, Patent First, supra note 46, at 539–45.
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2. A Revival of the Moral Utility Doctrine Provides Crucial
Flexibility, but Risks Abuse of Judicial Discretion
Many of the strengths of a statutory system would not exist
in a common law approach, but the reverse is also true—common
law has a unique set of strengths. First and foremost, common
law is more individually tailored because of its ex post nature,147
which is a necessary component of any regulatory scheme that
hopes to govern in a changing landscape. Further, since common
law is implemented on an individualized basis and evolves over
time, it mitigates the risk of a sudden and unwarranted shift in
the treatment of controversial biotechnologies.148 Ultimately, a
common law regulatory mechanism does not carry the same
risks of overbreadth or rigidity, which may make it more suitable
to the evolving ethical landscape of biotechnology.
The most desirable characteristic of reinstituting a form of
case law governance is its individually-tailored nature.149 There
is no risk of the over- or under-inclusivity inherent in statutory
regulation,150 or of utilizing language that is applicable to only
particular classes of technology.151 Instead, case law systems
provide a gradual development of well-tailored doctrine,
appropriately suited to individual factual circumstances.
Further, evidence suggests that—over time—case law
“converges toward more efficient and predictable legal rules.”152
This is of enormous benefit in the realm of biotechnology, where
inventors need some level of confidence in their ability to obtain
patents in order to justify extensive research and development
costs. Therefore, case law could provide a balance of flexibility
and predictability as long as future judges are able to avoid the

147. See, e.g., Anderlini et al., supra note 134, at 12–13 (discussing the ex
post nature of case law).
148. See sources cited supra note 134. Sudden passage of legislation could
prove more disruptive to the industry than beneficial to the public.
149. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Preferring Patent-Validity
Litigation over Second-Window Review and Gold-Plated Patents: When One Size
Doesn’t Fit All, How Could Two Do the Trick?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1937, 1945
(2009) (discussing the benefit of individualized litigation).
150. Id.
151. For example, ethical requirements or prohibitions for agricultural
enhancement technologies are likely to differ substantially from those that
apply to gene editing technologies, and vice versa.
152. Ponzetto & Fernandez, supra note 134, at 379 (“[Case law’s] evolution
converges toward more efficient and predictable legal rules. . . . [S]tatutes do
not share this evolutionary property.”).
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fate of the old Moral Utility Doctrine and apply a modern version
more even-handedly.
Like a purely statutory regime, an exclusively common law
approach to ethical consideration is not without its weaknesses.
As the Juicy Whip court highlighted more than a decade ago, one
concern is whether the judiciary even possesses the authority to
invalidate patents on ethical or moral grounds—or if that is, in
fact, the province of the legislature.153 If the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation is correct, relying on case law to regulate
biotechnology would be legally insufficient without the
involvement of the legislature.154 Therefore, a statutory
component might be a necessary—rather than simply
beneficial—element of an ethical regulatory system in patent
law.
Furthermore, the Moral Utility Doctrine was not applied
with any metric of consistency, which produced a complicated
doctrine and was arguably at least partially responsible for its
resulting disuse.155 Inconsistent application diminishes the
overall clarity of common law rules developed over time,
resulting in a loss of one of the greatest potential benefits of a
case law system.156 Convoluted precedent could also confuse
potential patent-seekers or patent-issuers, which could then
ultimately result in a reduced incentive for innovation.157 Since
appropriate incentivization is crucial to sustaining the balance
of the patent bargain, this potential pitfall cannot be overstated.
Additionally, there are certain issues inherent in the ex post
nature of a purely judicial regulatory scheme—as there are with
any ex post system.158 Common law is developed in the
153. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
154. More recently, this sentiment may have been echoed by the Supreme
Court. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); see also sources cited supra note
59 and accompanying text.
155. Smith, supra note 12, at 161.
156. Ponzetto & Fernandez, supra note 134, at 379 (“[Case law’s] evolution
converges toward more efficient and predictable legal rules. . . . [S]tatutes do
not share this evolutionary property.”).
157. It’s difficult to imagine that inventors—or, even, prospective inventors,
would not become frustrated with U.S. patent policy if there was a large degree
of unpredictability in the ethical invalidation of patents. Further, sporadic and
inconsistent invalidation of issued patents would undoubtedly be incredibly
frustrating to the USPTO as a whole, particularly if it was not provided with
coherent judicial guidance on how it should amend its patent issuance practices.
158. Anderlini et al., supra note 134, at 12–13.
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courtroom—in the face of an actual case or controversy159—
making it inherently retroactive.160 Patents on technologies that
are potentially detrimental to society must be granted and
utilized in the real world before a potential challenger can even
attempt to invalidate them.161 For this reason, the case law
regulatory mechanism falls victim to the plight of other ex post
facto regulatory attempts, and is forced to play “catch-up” to
rapidly-developing technologies rather than provide a
preventative solution.162 In the case of biotechnology—where
negative implications could manifest severely and rapidly—this
is a tremendous deficit.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a modern Moral
Utility Doctrine could fall victim to the varying moral and
ethical convictions of individual judges—possibly the biggest
risk in any potential regulatory scheme, and likely responsible
for the original failure of the system.163 Because of the nature of
the patent bargain,164 incorporating ethics into the patent
process should involve some level of consensus—ideally from the
public, but at least from some informed and impacted group of
people—on where to draw the lines of ethical limitation.
Conceptions of ethics and morality can vary widely between
individuals, and judges are no exception.165 Therefore, ethically
regulating patent issuance exclusively through case law leaves
these determinations subject to immense variability and
potential misuse.166

159. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
160. Id.
161. For a brief but interesting discussion of the different policy
considerations in ex ante and ex post evaluation of an issue, consider Anderlini
et al.’s patent litigation example. Anderlini et al., supra note 134, at 12–13.
(“From an ex-ante perspective, as it is standard, the optimal breadth of the
patent will be determined taking into account the trade-off between the
incentives to invest in R&D, and the social cost of monopoly power exercised by
the patent owner. Ex post, however, since the R&D investments are sunk, it is
always socially optimal to rule in favor of the infringer and thus open the
market to competition.”).
162. Anderlini et al., supra note 134, at 5.
163. See generally Smith, supra note 12.
164. See generally Ghosh, supra note 9, at 1316–18, 1328–29.
165. J.M. KIZZA, Morality and the Law, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 15 (2010) (“Although moral values are generally shared
values in a society, the degree of sharing these values varies greatly.”).
166. Id.

2018]

BIOTECHNOLOGY’S GREAT DIVIDE

597

C. CRAFTING AN OPTIMAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Rather than employing exclusively legislative change or
common law revival, an ideal regulatory scheme would utilize
components of both mechanisms in order to maximize flexibility
and responsiveness, while minimizing inconsistency. Therefore,
ethical regulation would be most effectively accomplished by
combining a carefully-crafted statutory amendment—that
leaves an appropriate amount of procedural flexibility to the
USPTO—with a limited revival of the Moral Utility Doctrine.
Such a regulatory scheme would allow for consideration of a
technology’s ethical implications early in its life cycle without
placing undue emphasis on potential negative effects, effectively
increasing both public benefit and public protection.
1. Characteristics of an Ideal Schema
In promoting this particular regulatory framework, it is
important The ideal approach for ethical regulation in patent
law would be to incorporate a broad statutory provision
allowing denial of a patent on ethical grounds, while leaving
the specific USPTO examiner protocol relatively flexible.167
This would be most effective if coupled with a limited revival of
the Moral Utility Doctrine, which would allow for some judicial
oversight should the USPTO’s interpretation of the statute
traverse too far from the current state of society’s moral and
ethical values.168 By utilizing the legislative branch, the
relevant agency, and the judiciary in tandem, this approach
would provide an opportunity for flexible ethical regulation,
wherein each component is subject to balancing and
supervision by the others.
In drafting the initial federal statute, generality is key.
Ideally, Congress could look to the approach taken by the TRIPS
Agreement and the EPC, and simply institute the opportunity
for considerations in the vein of ordre public.169 Encouraging this
level of abstraction limits the opportunity for political pushback

167. See Bagley, Patent First, supra note 46, at 541.
168. Id. (“[T]he judiciary branch . . . is perhaps best suited to engage in line
drawing of this sort.”).
169. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, supra note 66; The European Patent Convention, supra note 67
(discussing the broad approaches of two international preeminent intellectual
property law treaties to ethical regulations).
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from lobbying groups,170 while still establishing some discrete
statutory requirement allowing ethical considerations into the
patent examination room. Although very general legislation can
be susceptible to misinterpretation, that susceptibility is
reduced by coupling the legislation with a clear purpose,171 as
well as judicial and agency-based oversight.172
An important component of avoiding the pitfalls of the
historical Moral Utility Doctrine is increasing the input of the
USPTO in the regulatory process, as well as increasing its
discretion in implementing examination guidelines. As the
entity with the most intimate knowledge of the technology that
it examines, discourse between the USPTO and the judicial
branch is essential to the success of this regulatory system.173 If
the governing statute was sufficiently flexible, the USPTO could
then tailor the ethical requirements using internal procedure.174
These internal guidelines would need to be somewhat more

170. By contrast—as in, if legislation were to be enacted on a technology-bytechnology basis—Congress could be subject to immense pressure from lobbying
groups backing certain technologies, even if those technologies in fact do present
grave ethical risks. Therefore, that approach is politically undesirable. Bagley,
Patent First, supra note 46, at 541 (“Alternatively . . . though likely more
hazardous from a political standpoint, Congress could enact specific, subject
matter-based legislation.”).
171. In particular, a record of legislative history explaining the statutes
purpose may be of use in subsequent judicial interpretation. See Clarence
Miller, The Value of Legislative History of Federal Statutes, U. PENN. L. REV.
158 (1925).
172. But see Bagley, Patent First, supra note 46, at 541 (arguing that a
statute drafted with general language could, in effect, cause a reversion to the
original Moral Utility Doctrine scheme). Undoubtedly, this is a possibility. The
only hope for avoiding such a repeat history would be clear communication
between Congress and the judiciary as the statute is interpreted (and, perhaps,
additional, technology-specific legislation if necessary to clarify), coupled with
continued feedback from the USPTO.
173. This relationship could be informal—in large part, in order to respect
the talismanic “separation of powers”—but would be essential in avoiding
reversion to the old Moral Utility approach.
174. More than likely, this would involve incorporating guidelines for the
treatment of the ethical implications of a given technology into the USPTO’s
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), which “outlines the
procedures carried out by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.” It serves as
a handbook for patent examiners during the patent application process, and
“describes all of the laws and regulations that must be followed in the
examination of U.S. patent applications, and articulates in detail their
application to an enormous variety of different factual situations.” Patent Lens,
CAMBIA, http://www.bios.net/daisy/patentlens/2595.html. See generally MPEP,
supra note 23.
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technologically specific than the original federal statute in order
to be useful, and would ideally be informed by both professional
society guidelines175 and public opinion.176 Utilizing the relevant
agency in this way is beneficial in part because agency policy can
be generated and amended more quickly than legislation, and in
part because of the USPTO’s unique technological expertise.
Ultimately, involvement of the USPTO in developing
examination procedure would help to offset any of the potential
detriments of a very general statutory ethical regulation
allowance, and its communication with the judiciary would help
minimize the risks of inappropriate or unintended judicial
interpretation.
Finally, the ideal system would incorporate some level of
reinvigoration of the Moral Utility Doctrine. Since litigation is a
necessary and fundamental component of the patent system,
judges need a way to evaluate the validity of issued patents on
all relevant grounds—including ethical grounds, were the
opportunity to be added. Furthermore, judges are uniquely
qualified to perform difficult “line drawing,” and therefore would
play a necessary role in defining the parameters of which
inventions
are
ethically
permissible.177
Additionally,
incorporating judicial opinion, by default, incorporates the
perspective of the general public, since judges are frequently no
175. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., supra note 85. The National
Academy of Science guidelines on gene editing could—and, arguably, should—
be instructive in amending the MPEP, as they are the preeminent ethical
guidelines on gene editing at present. The National Academy of Science
recommends abstaining from genome editing for purposes of “enhancement,”
and cautions against germline editing without “ongoing reassessment and
public participation.” See Report Highlights, supra note 87. The USPTO might
incorporate these recommendations by instructing examiners to deny claims
that could encompass these activities. In practice, this would create a system
where the National Academy of Science informs USPTO patentability policy
similarly to the way that the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC)
informs National Institutes of Health research policy. See generally supra notes
91–93. In this way, the USPTO would give professional consensus guidelines
legal force.
176. Informal (or “notice-and-comment”) rulemaking is a mechanism by
which the USPTO could incorporate public opinion in this internal policy. See
Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T (2015),
https://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/2578. This style of rulemaking involves
proposing a rule in the Federal Register, and responding to comments from the
general public. Id. Further, Congress could—if it so desired—require the
USPTO to entertain even more public participation than required by informal
rulemaking (or the USPTO itself could choose to do so). Id.
177. See J.M. Kizza, supra note 168.
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more knowledgeable about a particular niche technology than
the average layperson.178 In many ways, this is as close to a
representation of public opinion as can be realistically achieved
in a representative democracy. Therefore—as long as the other
components of the proposed policy continue to function in a
complementary capacity—a “modern Moral Utility Doctrine”
could develop over time without a disproportionate risk of
judicial overstep.
2. Necessary Limitations: A Balancing Act
In promoting this particular regulatory framework, it is
important to acknowledge the necessary limitations, as well as
the policy goals that should govern its implementation. This
system is designed to require consideration of a technology’s
ethical implications, while maintaining some degree of
analytical flexibility—an equilibrium that should be continually
re-calibrated to reflect society’s evolving moral and ethical
convictions.179 Therefore, it will be necessary to re-analyze and
re-incorporate public opinion at various points in the future,
particularly after watershed developments in a particular
field—like the discovery of the CRISPR-Cas9 system.
Additionally, introducing any new considerations into
patent prosecution—ethical or otherwise—necessitates a
reexamination of the crucial patent law “balancing act.” At every
turn, we must strive to serve the constitutional policy goal of
promoting innovation,180 while ensuring that the public is
adequately benefited and protected.181 If our ethical restrictions
become too severe and patents become too illusive for the
inventor, innovation is disincentivized and, ultimately, the
public suffers.182 Similarly, if we continue to operate without any

178. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, YALE L.J. 2
(2010).
179. The patent process truly is a bargain, in which the public is a
participant. As such, their inclusion in negotiation should be requisite. See
Ghosh, supra note 9; see also supra note 119 and accompanying text. Since
public opinion evolves over time, renegotiations are necessary.
180. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
181. For a discussion of this central policy consideration—as well as many
others at play in patent law—see Dan Burk & Mark Lemley, Policy Levers in
Patent Law, VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003).
182. In this instance, society experiences a decreased level of innovation as
compared to a less-restrictive patent law environment. Since innovations are
often beneficial, this results in a net decrease in public benefit.
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ethical constraints at all, the public will also suffer.183 The
appropriate balance of incentive and protection lies somewhere
in the middle—it is as elusive as it is desirable, making
perpetual reevaluation of a necessary component of any
successful patent system.
D. REVISITING CRISPR-CAS9
Proposing an ideal regulatory scheme is significantly easier
than employing it in practice. The CRISPR system is an
exemplary biotechnology around which to debate patentability
because it highlights many of the ethical dilemmas associated
with gene editing technology. However, CRISPR also illustrates
the complexity of attempting to apply patentability restrictions
to technologies that have a wide array of applications. For
example, is possible to use CRISPR-Cas9 to edit human
embryos,184 but it can just as easily be used to enhance crop
yield185 or alter flower color.186 Some of these uses are clearly
more contentious than others. Should we deny patent protection
to the entire technology because of a handful of its applications?
The answer is not simple. Some technologies would almost
certainly be barred by the proposed regulatory framework: for
example, those encompassing biological weapons.187 In this case,
the patent “balancing act” would tip plainly in favor of societal
disapprobation—whatever benefit these technologies provide is
183. Contrastingly, refusal to restrict patent issuance on ethical grounds
allows technologies with potential negative effects to run rampant, and their
innovation is encouraged because it appears to be condoned by both society and
the government. See Bagley, Patent First, supra note 46, at 535 (indicating that
the government places its “imprimatur on [a particular technology] via a patent
grant”).
184. See, e.g., Puping Liang et al., supra note 4.
185. See Dom Galeon, Geneticists Have Used CRISPR Gene Editing to Create
Crops
that
Grow
More
Food,
FUTURISM
(Sept.
14,
2017),
https://futurism.com/geneticists-have-used-crispr-gene-editing-to-create-cropsthat-grow-more-food/.
186. See David Nield, For the First Time, CRISPR Has Been Used to
Dramatically Change Flower Colour, SCIENCEALERT (Sept. 9, 2017),
https://www.sciencealert.com/now-scientists-are-using-crispr-to-change-thecolour-of-flowers.
187. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,523,478 (claiming a “rifle-launched nonlethal cargo dispenser” that can be filled with cartridges containing
“chemical/biological agents,” among other substances). This patent was actually
issued, and was the subject of substantial ethical controversy. See, e.g., Erika
Check, US Army Attacked over Published Patent for ‘Bioweapons Grenade’,
NATURE (June 19, 2003), https://www.nature.com/articles/423789a.
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unlikely to warrant the risk of their misuse. A more borderline
instance might involve a claim encompassing human neural
material,188 wherein the potential medical benefits may or may
not outweigh concerns about autonomy and morality. To be sure,
this kind of marginal technology presents some opportunity for
judicial overstep or abuse189—a variance in human conviction
that no regulatory system can entirely preclude. In the case of
CRISPR-Cas9, however, it is unlikely that professional
consensus,190 international approaches,191 or current public
opinion192 would instruct barring patentability entirely. Instead,
subjecting CRISPR to the recommended framework is still likely
to indicate that it merits patent protection—the technology has

188. The use of human neural material is often debated by bioethicists in
the context of chimeras. See Allison Harvey & Brian Salter, Anticipatory
Governance: Bioethical Expertise for Human/Animal Chimeras, 21 SCI. AS
CULTURE 291 (2012) (discussing the hypothetical “human neuron mouse,”
which is “a mouse in which the brain neurons [are] replace [sic] with human
neural stem cells”). Whether or not the use of human neural material is
excluded from patentability by the Patent Act remains uncertain, and hinges
on whether the use of such material is seen as creating a claim that is “directed
to a human organism.” See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 11229, § 33, 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human
organism.”).
189. This “abuse” refers to judges imparting their own moral and ethical
convictions into legal decision-making. In such instances, a judge might
invalidate a patent that society would collectively choose to uphold.
190. Although it has issued cautionary statements about certain
applications—namely, enhancement and germline modification—the National
Academy of Science appears to be supportive of gene editing in certain contexts.
See Report Highlights, supra note 87.
191. For example, even Europe has issued patents that cover CRISPR
technology, although a struggle persists as to ownership rights. See, e.g., Kelly
Servick, Broad Institute Takes a Hit in European CRISPR Patent Struggle, SCI.
(Jan. 18, 2018, 3:30 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/01/broadinstitute-takes-hit-european-crispr-patent-struggle. In general, the European
Union appears to be moving toward relaxing its restrictions on the use of gene
editing. See Alex Dale, European Court Supports the Softening of CRISPR Gene
Editing Rules, LABIOTECH (Jan. 22, 2018), https://labiotech.eu/crispr-geneediting-court/.
192. At present, the public also appears to be generally supportive of gene
editing technology. See Stephen M. Weissberg et al., A CRISPR New World:
Attitudes in the Public Toward Innovation in Human Genetic Modification, 5
FRONTIERS IN PUB. HEALTH 1 (2017) (“Respondents supported genetic
modification research, although demographic variables influenced these
attitudes—conservatives, women, African-Americans, and older respondents,
while supportive, were more cautious than liberals, men, other ethnicities, and
younger respondents.”) (emphasis added).
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too many ethically permissible applications to warrant total
denunciation in the name of a select few, which could be
addressed individually.193 Therefore, this Note does not purport
to recommend total condemnation of any technology that
implicates ethical concerns. Instead, it simply attempts to
encourage discourse—involving all participants in the patent
bargain—about the ethical risks we are willing to accept in
exchange for technological progress.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite other approaches taken internationally, the current
U.S. patent system provides no opportunity to consider the
ethical implications of a technology during the patent process.
There has never been a statutory basis for doing so,194 and the
common law doctrine that once allowed such considerations to
be the basis of patent invalidation—the Moral Utility Doctrine—
has been dormant for at least a decade.195 To date, its status
remains uncertain. Current biotechnological developments have
brought once-dystopian ethical concerns to the forefront of public
discourse, providing a renewed opportunity to establish a
relationship between ethics and patent law in the U.S.
The ramifications of a technology are necessary
considerations in patent law because patent issuance is a
bargaining process— the public must receive a true net benefit
in exchange its recognition of a patentee’s limited monopoly
right. Further, evaluating an emerging technology’s ethical
implications during the patent process—rather than after they
have achieved mainstream commercial use—is a uniquely
proactive way to regulate rapidly-evolving technologies before
they impact the general public. However, effective evaluation of
the ethical considerations inherent to new biotechnologies
cannot be adequately accomplished by preventative legislation
or common law supervision alone. Instead, a blended approach
involving a legislative provision that mimics international

193. For example, a would-be CRISPR patentee could be required to
disclaim certain ethically controversial subject matter—such as use of the
technology in vertebrate animals—in a similar way that patentees are required
to disclaim subject matter encompassing a human organism. See generally
Crouch, supra note 35.
194. Bagley, Patent First, supra note 46, at 532 (“[T]he United States has
never had a statutory morality exception to patentability.”).
195. See supra notes 47–56 and accompanying text.
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approaches and accommodates discretion in agency policy,
combined with a limited revival of a modernized Moral Utility
Doctrine, strikes the appropriate balance between incentivizing
innovation and protecting the public interest. Whether patent
protection for CRISPR-Cas9 and its progeny would ultimately be
disallowed by this schema is speculative, but it creates a
regulatory environment equipped to handle the complex ethical
implications of 21st Century biotechnology—making it an ideal
approach to U.S. patent law for the years to come.

